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Abstract—Trust management of Internet of connected vehicles 
has been a hot topic during the recent years with the rapid 
development of UGV technologies. However, existing resolutions 
based on trustworthiness verification among vehicles make the 
traffic event transmission quite inefficient. In this paper, we 
assume that the deployed RSUs can provide efficient 
communication between any pair of RSU and vehicle, and propose 
Vcash, a reputation framework for identifying denial of traffic 
service, to resolve the trustworthiness problem in the application 
level of the Internet of connected vehicles. 
In our reputation framework, every vehicle communicates with 
the RSU directly for traffic event verification, and spread verified 
traffic event notification. We borrow the idea of market trading, 
and set up trading rules to restrict the malicious vehicle’s spread 
of false message, and to encourage vehicles to contribute to the 
traffic event monitoring and verification. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of our reputation framework, we conduct simulation 
experiment. Our experiment results indicate that our proposal 
manages to avoid bogus event spread, and a vehicle in our 
framework has to contribute to the traffic event detection to 
normally employ the traffic service. 
 
Index Terms— Vehicle Cash, traffic event, event trading, RSUs 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the rapid development of smart city techniques, a 
growing quantity of mobile equipment gets involved in 
people’s daily life, bringing great convenience together 
with huge risk. Vehicles with onboard units are typical 
examples among such mobile equipment. During recent years, 
the infrastructure of the vehicular network is developing rapidly, 
leading to growing interest on the Internet of connected vehicles. 
However, it is still very hard to identify the malicious 
information sent from neighboring vehicles[15]. When a 
vehicle broadcasts a false message in the Vehicular networks, 
the vehicles in the same network may take the wrong actions, 
leading to a bad traffic accident. Herein, to construct a robust 
and secure trust management framework [15-27] for the 
Internet of connected vehicles turns out to be a critical problem 
for the actual deployment of UGV. 
 The reputation-based mechanism is a commonly used 
technique for the defense of attacks on traffic service. Based on 
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the cooperation of vehicles, researchers evaluate the 
trustworthiness of traffic warning messages according to the 
trustworthiness between vehicles (entity-centric methods[15-
18]), or according to the message content itself (data-centric 
methods[22-24]). In spite of the rationality of such two kinds of 
methods, existing resolutions always involve V2V (vehicle-to-
vehicle) network whose trustworthiness is not guaranteed. Thus 
message broadcast upon such network always needs an 
additional method to ensure that no bogus events are spread. 
However, due to the high mobility of the V2V networks, the 
schemes to ensure V2V network’s trustworthiness are costly 
[22-24]. 
 The existing resolutions assume that the quantity of RSUs 
(Road Side Unit) is limited [22-30], and V2V network 
communication is very important to ensure the network 
connectivity. As a result, the communication between the RSU 
and the vehicle could be badly delayed, and turns out to be the 
bottleneck if it involves in the process of verifying the 
trustworthiness of a traffic event message. However, with the 
growing deployment of vehicular network infrastructure and 
the huge demand on the Internet of connected vehicles, the 
quantity of RSUs is turning out to be sufficient for a quick 
response to the vehicle request, especially in the downtown area 
of cities. Thus, we believe that the communication between 
RSUs and vehicles could be efficient enough for traffic events 
verification in the near future. Therein, we propose to verify the 
traffic events based on RSUs, i.e. to ensure all traffic events 
message sent by RSUs are verified to be trustworthy, and 
conduct traffic event verification on the RSUs. 
 Considering the advantages of both entity-centric methods 
and data-centric methods, and few existing works propose to 
evaluate the reputation of both entity and data, in this paper, we 
propose a reputation framework which manages the reputation 
of both vehicles and the generated traffic events. Our reputation 
framework is based on an incentive mechanism. All vehicles in 
our framework are encouraged to contribute to the traffic event 
detection as much as possible. For each vehicle, the detected 
traffic events have to be correct, or the vehicle would be 
punished. To that end, each vehicle is initialized with a certain 
amount of capital (noted as vehicle cash), and a vehicle has to 
invest on each traffic event it spreads to make it accepted by the 
RSUs. The RSUs sell the traffic event for the generator if the 
traffic event could be verified. Thus the invested traffic events 
Xiangsong Gao is with China Academy of Engineer Physics, Mianyang, 
Sichuan, China. 
Corresponding author: Shen Su, Email: johnsuhit@gmail.com 
Vcash: A Novel Reputation Framework for 
Identifying Denial of Traffic Service in Internet 
of Connected Vehicles 
Zhihong Tian, Xiangsong Gao, Shen Su*, and Jing Qiu 
W 
2327-4662 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2951620, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL 2 
could be profitable if it is a de facto traffic event. However, for 
malicious vehicles which send bogus events, they would 
quickly run out of their vehicle cash, and could send no more 
bogus events since none of their generated traffic events are 
profitable. For vehicles which send no messages, they would 
also run out of vehicle cash, and could employ the traffic service 
no more since every traffic event warning costs. 
 Our proposed reputation framework could be taken as a 
combination of the entity-centric methods and data-centric 
methods. Every vehicle’s Vcash indicates its capability to 
spread invested traffic events, thus could reveal the reputation 
of the vehicle. The investment of each traffic event is used to 
decide whether the RSUs should accept the traffic events, thus 
could reveal the reputation of the data, and determine the 
management conducted to the data. 
 Our contribution in this paper includes three folds: 
 First, we propose vehicle cash, a reputation framework for 
the identifying denial of traffic service, which applies for the 
trend of growing deployment of RSUs, and growing interest in 
the Internet of connected vehicles. 
 Second, we discuss the multiple threaten modes for the denial 
of traffic service attack, including the selfish attack mode. We 
also propose a corresponding resolution to restrict the spread of 
false message, and to encourage contribution of traffic 
condition monitoring and verification. 
 Third, we conduct simulation experiments to prove the 
effectiveness of our reputation framework. Our experiments 
indicate that Vcash could efficiently reduce the bogus event 
spread, and encourage all vehicles involving in traffic event 
monitoring and verification. 
In the rest of this paper, we will first introduce the related 
works in Section2. Then will give the problem statement in 
Section 3, and we present our reputation framework in Section 
4. We evaluate the effectiveness of our reputation framework in 
Section 5, and conclude our proposal with future work in 
Section 6. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The security issue is considered as the very fundamental of 
the Internet of connected vehicles, and numerous outstanding 
works have been devoted to this field. The foundational security 
aspects mainly concern the behaviors that would threaten the 
functionality of Internet of connected vehicles, researchers have 
proposed several schemes and frameworks to cope with the 
corresponding problems. Refs. [1] proposed the mobile 
protocols in order to promote the effectiveness of 
communication between the vehicles.  [2] designed the layer 
protocols and control mechanism to improve the tracking 
accuracy as well as decrease the congestion of vehicular 
networks. These researches also consider problems such as the 
information aggregation [3], DDOS attack [4], the trade-off 
between security and performance [5], et al. 
The other works mainly contribute to the security of the 
application level, and these works have been well surveyed in 
[6-14]. In general, the dishonest and the refuse-to-participate 
behaviors are considered as the most severe threat to the 
vehicular networks, and the reputation mechanism is widely 
adopted to conquer these threats. Two types of arbitration 
methods are included in the state of the art contributions. 
The entity-based researches such as [15-18] consider the 
vehicle as the object of the reputation, and they will decide the 
behavior of vehicular networks by judging the reputation of 
each vehicle entity.  
Refs. [19] proposed an evaluation method for the data 
generating process. Every single vehicle is set up with a 
processing flow of behaving and validation. This design of 
reputation is also involved in its future researches like [20] and 
[21]. However, most of these researches are considered as low 
real-time performance [7]. 
In other researches, the event-based solutions such as [22-24] 
tend to assign the reputation value to the runtime event. Refs. 
[25] proposed an event-centric trust establishment framework 
and applied it to the traffic safety application. The novel 
concept is to evaluate the trustiness of sensed data or received 
messages rather than the trust of the individual vehicle. Beside 
[25], other researches which tried to optimize the method 
generally attempted to arbitrate by the time [23], sensor 
capability [24] and so on. However, the black hole attack [26] 
cannot be avoided in such kind of frameworks. [27] proposed 
an incentive-based method to conduct credit management in the 
vehicular networks, which rewards positive activity and punish 
negative activity. Their method also suffers from the vehicle-
to-vehicle trust management in spite of their incentive-based 
credit management scheme. As a wider range, wireless issues 
has also drawn much more research interest [28-35] during the 
last two decades. 
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Generally, our idea in this paper is to build a reputation based 
trust management framework for the Internet of connected 
vehicles. Since the end-to-end communication security is not 
our topic in this paper, and the message confidentiality and 
integrity could be ensured by encryption and digital signature 
techniques, in this paper, we assume that all vehicles take 
necessary approaches to ensure the end-to-end message 
communication security. As a result, we discuss our foundation 
of reputation framework in the application layer, more 
specifically, as the foundation of traffic service. 
The objective of our reputation framework is to encourage all 
vehicles in the network of connected vehicles to provide 
qualified sensed traffic events. Herein, we focus on 
identification of the malicious vehicles which keeps sending 
bogus events or send no message at all. 
In the rest of this section, we will present the basic 
assumption and statement of our problem. 
A. Network Model 
In our vehicular network which provides traffic service, the 
communicating entities are vehicles (more specifically, the 
OBU, onboard units) and base stations on the roadside (i.e., 
RSU). Considering the vehicles and RSU could involve in 
different applications, we assume that all vehicles and RSUs 
could communicate with each other. An OBU has limited 
communication range, thus could only communicate with a 
limited number of other OBUs and RSUs. All OBUs and RSUs 
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take appropriate approaches to ensure the information integrity 
and confidentiality. 
Vehicles run in bi-direction on the road with different speed, 
and every vehicle is equipped with appropriate sensors to 
capture the traffic events (such as traffic jam, traffic accident, 
road condition, etc.). In our network model, traffic events 
randomly happened in the roadmap, and last for a certain period 
of time. We assume that the vehicles appropriately cover the 
traffic events in our roadmap, i.e. all traffic events would be 
efficiently verified in our network. 
The sensed traffic events information (including time, 
location, traffic event type or description, etc.) are collected by 
the onboard units, and sent to other OBUs and RSUs. All 
vehicles travel randomly. With the appropriate warning of the 
traffic service, a vehicle would be able to avoid running into 
any traffic events by surprise. 
B. Threaten Modes 
Since we assume secure end-to-end communication, to 
conduct denial of traffic service, a vehicle could: 1) send a 
bogus event including fake traffic events; 2) or send no 
messages at all. 
⚫ Bogus event mode 
If a vehicle keeps reporting fake traffic event messages, we 
term that vehicle is in a bogus event mode. A fake traffic event 
message refers to a message indicating traffic events which 
never happen, or at wrong time/location. If a vehicle keeps 
receiving this kind of message, it could be a disturbance to the 
driver. And such fake warning could bring down the trust of the 
driver to the traffic service. More importantly, when a genuine 
traffic event happened and sent to the passing-by vehicles, such 
waring may draw very little attention because of the low trust 
of the traffic service, leading to potential driving risk. 
The bogus event mode applies to the malicious vehicles 
which intentionally generate fake messages and broadcast them 
in the network. Moreover, the bogus event mode also applies to 
the vehicle with unqualified sensors or software. Due to the 
defects of hardware and software, a vehicle could generate 
inaccurate information and tell other vehicles wrong 
information. 
⚫ Selfish mode 
If a vehicle reports no traffic event message at all, we term 
that vehicle is in a selfish mode. The bogus event mode indicts 
sending fake messages, i.e., false positive detection in the traffic 
service. To the opposite, false negative detection could also 
decrease the drivers’ trust in the traffic service, and surprise the 
driver when they encounter the traffic events. 
Since assurance of qualified traffic environment sensing 
could increase the vehicle maintenance cost, a vehicle has the 
motivation to shut down all traffic event sensing and use the 
traffic service. However, if all vehicles work in such a manner, 
the quality of traffic service could still be terrible. Herein, we 
need to discuss how to defend from this attack mode, and 
encourage all vehicles to send qualified sensed traffic events. 
C. Traffic Events Detection and Verification 
In this paper, we assume all traffic events are sensed by 
vehicles without the help of RSU. We make this assumption 
because sensors can only accurately cover a limited ranage; thus 
an RSU can merely cover the traffic events within a limited 
range. However, vehicles can cover all over the roadmap since 
their mobility. As a result, the help of RSU is very limited, and 
we do not want to make the problem more complex with the 
involvement of traffic events captured by RSUs. 
When a traffic event happens, it would be detected by the 
first vehicle capturing its corresponding information and 
broadcast it all over the network (if it is not an attacking vehicle). 
To verify the existence of the reported traffic events, we rely on 
the cross-validation of the reported events, i.e., if a traffic event 
is reported multiple times, there would be a high possibility that 
it is a de facto traffic event. 
D. Problem Formulation 
Given the above assumptions and descriptions, our problem 
could be formulated as an optimizing problem defined on a 5-
tuple (V, RSU, E, C, f). 
⚫ V: The set of vehicles in the network. A vehicle 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 
is represented by a 5-tuple (id, location, dir, vel, 
event(id)). Here id refers to the identification of the 
vehicle; location refers to the vehicle’s location; dir 
refers to the vehicle’s direction; vel refers to the 
vehicle’s velocity. event(id) =( 𝑒𝑣
(1)
, 𝑒𝑣
(2)
, … , 𝑒𝑣
(𝑛), … )  
refers to the reported traffic event messages in time 
sequence. A vehicle could work in a normal mode, 
which generates qualified traffic event reports; a bogus 
mode which keeps generating fake traffic event reports; 
or a selfish mode which generates no traffic event report. 
⚫ RSU: The set of roadside units. The information of a 
roadside unit includes its location and identification. 
⚫ E: The set of traffic events happening in the problem 
roadmap. We use a 4–tuple (start, end, location, attr) to 
represent a traffic event e. Here start refers to the start 
time of a traffic event; end refers to the end time; 
location refers to where the event happens; and attr 
refers to a set of certain predefined event attributes (e.g., 
traffic jam, overflow pavement). 
⚫ C: a successive value range which is a metric of the trust 
of a vehicles or a traffic event message. A higher value 
represents more trust. 
⚫ f: a mapping from 𝑉 ∪ 𝐸 to C. Obviously, f assigns a 
reputation to each vehicle and event. 
As a formulation, we aim at optimizing the mapping of f, for 
de facto events, the corresponding vehicles should learn the 
messages with high credibility; for fake events or outdated 
events, the corresponding vehicles should learn the messages 
with low credibility or ignore them. As for vehicles, malicious 
vehicles or selfish vehicles should not be able to generate high 
credibility events. And normal vehicle should be able to keep 
sensing the traffic condition to work for the traffic service. 
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IV. REPUTATION FRAMEWORK 
Both entity-centric reputation framework and event-centric 
reputation framework have their intrinsic advantages, and we 
believe that both the communication entities and traffic event 
messages should be evaluated by a corresponding reputation for 
trust management on the Internet of connected vehicles. The 
event reputation is needed since traffic event is always dynamic. 
Entity reputation is needed since threatening vehicles always 
behave similarly because of their original intention, and 
recognizing such entities could improve the accuracy of traffic 
event evaluation. Herein, at the end of the trade-off between 
entity-based methods and event-based methods, we propose 
VCash (Vehicle Cash) as a reputation framework for trust 
management on the Internet of connected vehicles. 
Our inspiration comes from the market system. In a market 
system, an entity has to carefully invest in the right product to 
ensure the normal running of its business. Otherwise, the 
entity’s cash flow would fracture if the invested product cannot 
be sold. Similarly, we make our reputation framework works as 
a market, all vehicles involved act as a business entity and 
initialized with a certain amount of vehicle cash. When a 
vehicle captures a traffic event, it has to invest a certain amount 
of vehicle cash on the traffic event. Thus, a vehicle in our 
framework has to invest in the successful events to ensure its 
vehicle cash flow could normally run. By setting up trading 
rules, our market guarantees: 1) merely the de facto traffic 
events are profitable; 2) traffic events invested with little 
vehicle cash could hardly be accepted. As a result, all traffic 
events broadcasted by vehicles working in bogus event mode of 
selfish mode can hardly be approved. 
Our reputation framework utilizes vehicle cash to represent 
the reputation of vehicles and broadcasted traffic events. The 
vehicles owing more vehicle cash could broadcast more high 
reputation traffic events. The traffic events with more vehicle 
cash indicate the detector is in good marketing condition. In the 
rest of this section, we will first give an overview of our 
framework, followed by the framework detail including vehicle 
service model, zoning market and trading plans. 
A. Framework Overview 
 
Figure 1 Framework infrastructure 
We first introduce the overview of our reputation framework. 
On the point of infrastructure (shown in Fig 1), our reputation 
framework is composed of vehicles, RSUs, and central servers. 
The vehicles sense the traffic condition, capturing traffic events, 
and send the sensed events to the RSUs. To benefit from the 
traffic service, vehicles also need to capture the broadcasted 
traffic events sent by other vehicles. Since our reputation 
framework works on the base of trading, we need a trustable 
trading platform to conduct event investment and event selling. 
In this paper, we assign the job of trustable event trading to the 
RSUs. I.e., we assume that the RSUs are trustable in this paper. 
When a vehicle detects a traffic event message, it sends the 
event message to the RSUs for event verification. When the 
detected traffic events are verified according to the method 
discussed in Sec 3.C, the RSUs then broadcast the traffic event 
message to the other vehicles. Considering the mobility of the 
vehicles, an RSU may need to deal with the trading of vehicles 
out of its range limit. Thus we need a central server to take 
charge of communication of multiple RSUs. The central server 
collects the result of event trading, and maintains a global view 
of each vehicle. The central server may encounter a scalability 
problem. However, such a problem involves the distributed 
computation framework which is also a non-trivial problem. 
Since we do not want to discuss another non-trivial problem in 
this paper, our framework involves a single central server. The 
following works may introduce distributed computation 
techniques to our framework to solve the scalability problem. 
 
Figure 2  Framework functionality 
On the point of functionality, our reputation framework is 
composed of vehicle clients, zoning markets, and the bank (as 
shown in Fig 2). Vehicle clients are client applications running 
on the vehicles with an OBU. When a vehicle client detects a 
traffic event, the vehicle client pushes the event into the 
corresponding zoning market for event verification and selling. 
A zoning market is a server working on one or multiple RSUs, 
and manages the traffic events within a certain area. Thus a 
zoning market collects the traffic events happening in its 
response area, and charges the vehicles traveling in the area for 
notification of such events. Since a vehicle may travel from area 
to area, a vehicle may trade events in multiple zoning markets. 
Thus we need to manage the vehicle cash in a bank account for 
every vehicle client. In this paper, we manage a vehicle cash 
bank on the central server for bank account management. 
Our framework infrastructure is very similar to the existing 
works since they all conduct traffic service. Since our proposal 
is mainly about traffic event trading, in the following we 
introduce the detail of our reputation framework on the point of 
functionality. 
B. Vehicle Client 
As shown in Figure 3 is the structure of our vehicle client 
composed with event generator, event listener, event handler, 
event table, and event sender. The event generator takes the 
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streaming data generated by vehicle sensors as input and 
produces corresponding traffic event information (event 
attributes, timestamp, and location). The generated event 
information is directed to the event handler. 
 
Figure 3 Vehicle Client model 
The event listener monitors the event notifications which 
indicate the occurring traffic events. The event notifications are 
sent to the vehicle client, when the vehicle runs into the 
coverage area zone, when a new verified traffic event is 
broadcasted, or when a traffic event is verified to finalize. 
The event handler plays a central role in the vehicle client, 
since all the generated events and event notifications are 
directed to the event handler for its driving warning and 
decision. When the event handler receives a generated event, it 
integrates the vehicle identification into the event message, 
looking up the event routing table, and sends the event to the 
zoning market if the event is unknown. When the event handler 
receives a traffic event notification, it manages the event table 
according to the notification. An event notification could be 
event announcement of event withdraw; thus the management 
could be an insertion or delete of the event table. The event 
handler also monitors the occurrence of the existing traffic 
events in the zone, and if the vehicle passes by the location 
where an existing traffic event happens, and no traffic events 
are captured, the event handler will send a message to the 
zoning market to report the non-existence of the traffic event. 
When the vehicle runs out of a zone, the event deletes all the 
events in the event table. 
The sender directly communicates with the zoning market 
deployed on the neighboring RSU through the V2V or V2I 
network communications. 
It is noted that we do not conduct event investment in the 
vehicle client. Instead, we manage the account of each vehicle 
direct in the zoning market deployed on the RSUs. We do this 
because the event trading is deployed on the zoning market.  
Considering that the vehicle bank account is deployed on the 
vehicle client, an event trading has to wait for the confirmation 
of high-speed moving vehicles, and the trading efficiency 
would be badly delayed. 
C. Zoning Market 
A zoning market is responsible for the traffic event 
management of a certain block area (i.e., a zone), and deployed 
upon a set of RSUs within the block area. The main job of the 
zoning market is to: 1) conduct traffic event lifetime monitoring 
and verification; 2) and conduct event trading by the 
management of vehicle accounts according to the predefined 
trading plans. 
In Figure 4, we describe the process of communication 
between the vehicle, the zoning market, and the bank during the 
period that the vehicle gets through the zone. 
 
Figure 4  Communication process between zoning market, vehicle, and 
the bank 
When the vehicle firstly gets into the zone, it sends a message 
including its identity to the zoning market (①), then the zoning 
market sends a message to the bank to request the bank account 
information of the vehicle according to the identity of the 
vehicle (②). The bank sends back the account information if 
the corresponding account exists, or else creates a new account 
for the vehicle ( ③ ). Then the zoning market sends an 
acknowledgement message back to the vehicle to start trading 
events for the vehicle(④). When the vehicle travels in the zone, 
it monitors the traffic condition and sends corresponding 
messages to the zoning market ( ⑤ ). The zoning market 
correlates the received event messages, if multiple vehicles 
send similar event messages to the zoning market (similar event 
attributes, location, etc.), the zoning market will verify the 
existence of the traffic event with appropriate charge, and 
broadcast the traffic events to the other vehicles in the zone (⑥). 
When the vehicle runs out of the zone, it sends a message to the 
zoning market (⑦ ), making the zoning market upload its 
account information to the bank (⑧). After the vehicle gets out 
of the zone, since the traffic events generated by that vehicle 
may still exists in that zone, the zoning market keeps managing 
the profit of the corresponding events(⑨). It is also noted that 
⑧ may happen after ⑨), because the event may keep earning 
vehicle cash with the event left in the zoning market. An event 
would stop training if it is verified that the event no longer exists 
in the zoning market. 
D. Trading Plans 
In the above communication process, we set up the following 
rules to restrict the broadcast of event messages sent by 
malicious vehicles, and to encourage contribution to the traffic 
service. 
1) Event investment and profit: Every event announcement 
and event verification has to be invested in our system. The 
investment would get profit if the announced event keeps alive. 
When the event terminates, all the investment goes to the 
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vehicle which verifies the non-existence of the event. However, 
if an event verification if proved to be wrong, its investment 
would be expropriated.  
In step ⑤, the zoning market invests a certain amount of 
vehicle cash from the vehicle account into the event according 
to a predefined trading plan. If the invested vehicle cash is less 
than a predefined threshold, the zoning market will ignore the 
event message, i.e., if a vehicle account has little cash left, the 
messages sent by that vehicle can hardly be accepted by the 
zoning market. If multiple vehicles invest on the same event 
(same event location and event attributes), the zoning market 
grants each vehicle a share of the event stock according to each 
vehicle’s investment of the event, and distribute the earnings of 
each event according to each vehicle’s stock (according to 
formula 1). 
𝑆(𝑣𝑖) =  
𝐼(𝑣𝑖)
∑ 𝐼(𝑣𝑖)
× 𝑐 × |𝑍𝑉|        (1) 
Here 𝑆(𝑣𝑖) refers to the profit sharing of the vehicle 𝑣𝑖; 𝐼(𝑣𝑖) 
refers to the investment of 𝑣𝑖 ; ∑ 𝐼(𝑣𝑖)  refers to all the 
investment on the profiting traffic event; c refers to the fee for 
a traffic event notification which is a constant number; and |𝑍𝑉| 
refers to the set of vehicles paying for the event. 
To the end of protecting the broadcast of malicious event 
messages, we need to ensure that each vehicle cannot send a lot 
of event messages to the zoning market before its invested 
events start earning a profit. In this paper, we plan to invest a 
certain percentage of the rest vehicle cash in the vehicle account 
(as shown in formula 2). 
𝐼(𝑛) = 𝑉(𝑛 − 1) × 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜                                  (2) 
Here 𝐼(𝑛) refers to the invested vehicle cash of the nth event, 
and 𝑉(𝑛) refers to the rest of vehicle cash after investing on the 
nth event. Obviously, 𝑉(𝑛) =  𝑉(𝑛 − 1) − 𝐼(𝑛) . And ratio 
refers to the constant ratio we invest in each iteration.  
2) Event charging: In steps ④ and ⑥, the zoning market 
charges each vehicle client a certain amount of vehicle cash for 
each traffic event notification, which actually refers to the 
parameter c in equation 1. If the vehicle client doesn’t have 
enough money for all traffic events notification, the zoning 
market ranks all the events in a descending order according to 
their investment, and sends as many traffic event notifications 
as possible until there is not enough vehicle cash for more 
traffic event notification. In addition, the charge rate varies 
according to the number of events in the system. Simply put, 
the more events, the lower the rate. It is also noted that, with the 
restriction on the charging rate, we would be able to punish the 
selfish vehicles, since selfish vehicles would not be able to pay 
for the event notification because they has no way to earn 
money in our system. 
3) Event termination: If multiple vehicles send event 
messages to verify that a traffic event is nonexistent, the zoning 
market would terminate and the event, then take the vehicle 
cashes invested on the event as reward with the other vehicles 
which contribute in the event termination (according to formula 
3). 
𝑆(𝑣𝑖) =  
𝐼(𝑐𝑖)
∑ 𝐼(𝑐𝑖)
× ∑ 𝐼(𝑣𝑖)         (3) 
Here 𝑆(𝑣𝑖) refers to the profit sharing of the vehicle𝑣𝑖; 𝐼(𝑣𝑖) 
refers to the investment of 𝑣𝑖 ; ∑ 𝐼(𝑐𝑖)  refers to all the 
investment on verification of the event non-existence, and 
∑ 𝐼(𝑣𝑖) refers to all the investment of the event. 
V. EVALUATION 
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of our framework 
based on simulation. We discussed two attacking mode in this 
paper: selfish mode and bogus event mode. For the selfish mode, 
since vehicles in our framework has to pay for event notification, 
a selfish vehicle would be kicked out of the framework if it 
contribute nothing to the framework. In the rest of this section, 
we will focus on the protecting performance of our framework 
with all malicious vehicles working in the bogus event mode. 
A. Simulation setup 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed framework, we 
develop an event-based simulator, which simulates parallel 
vehicle behaviors. Our simulator takes self-defined roadmap, 
vehicles, and events, and we use it to simulate the vehicular 
network scenario happens in a zoning market. Since we assume 
that there are enough RSUs to ensure the efficient vehicle-RSU 
communication, we consider no channel status changing 
problems in this paper. 
In our simulation, the road map is a 5000 meter long ring 
road, which simulate the high way. We randomly generate and 
place a quantity of vehicles on our ring road. Every vehicle runs 
at a random speed between 10 and 30 meters per second with a 
random initialized direction. To simplify our problem analysis, 
we assume that the road of our experiment includes only one 
zoning market. 
We set up 10 events randomly distributed on the road at the 
beginning of the experiment. The duration of these events is 
randomly distributed between 60 and 600 seconds. After 
everything starts to work, every 60 seconds will have new 
events happening randomly on the road. Its duration is 
consistent with those of the initial events. Our simulation lasts 
for 1000 seconds. We rerun our simulation for 50 times, and 
calculate the average result as our evaluation result. 
We also place a number of threatening vehicles in our 
simulation. Since the main inaccuracy is caused by the vehicles 
works in bogus event mode, we focus on the evaluation of 
bogus event mode vehicles. It is noted that if our traffic event 
verification scheme needs more than two nodes to verify the 
existence of traffic events, and the malicious vehicles send a 
random bogus event, the bogus event can hardly be spread. 
Therein, we assume that all bogus event vehicles collide, and 
share one false event map. All such vehicles report a false traffic 
event every second. We use this as the "event flood" attack 
mentioned in the previous article. In our simulation, each 
vehicle is initialized with 100 vehicle cash. Since we want to 
set up a balanced charge rate in our simulation, the charge rate 
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of each event notification should be more or less equal to the 
investment of a traffic event. Therein, based on the floating 
rates mentioned above, we set the initial rate (“c” in equation 
(1))to one in ten thousand per event per second. As the number 
of events in the system changes, the specific rate will be the 
initial rate divided by the number of events. To accelerate the 
working process of our evaluation framework, we accelerate the 
bogus events emission speed as 1 bogus event per second, so 
that the malicious would be quickly recognized. 
B. Traffic service accuracy 
Our reputation framework aims at restricting the bogus event 
spread. Herein, our key metric to evaluate the reputation 
framework is the amount of bogus events compared to the 
normal messages. In Figure 5, we show the percentage of bogus 
events out of all existing events over time in our simulation. As 
described in the previous subsection, our simulation starts from 
a randomly initialized status, and we rerun the our simulation 
for 50 times and show the average result value in Figure 5. 
Considering that the amount of randomly placed vehicles in our 
simulation would impact the experiment results, we conduct 3 
groups of experiments with various vehicle placement density 
(10 vehicles per kilometer, 20 vehicles per kilometer, and 30 
vehicles per kilometer). Considering our framework requires 
multiple messages to verify a bogus event, we also conduct our 
experiments with various “m” parameters, which refers to the  
 
Figure 5. Bogus event ratio over time (seconds). We compare our method with VIME used in [27]. Since the performance of VIME relies on the 
accuracy their entity based reputation, we set the accuracy as 99%( Accuracy=.1) and 99.9%( Accuracy=.01) individually. p refers to the density of 
vehicles on the road map which is 10 vehicles per kilometer for the 3 figures in the first line, 20 vehicles per kilometer for the second line, and 30 
vehicles per kilometer for  the third line. 
quantity of traffic event messages needed for verification of 
traffic event termination. 
As a comparison, we also conduct the reputation framework 
proposed VIME [27], which is similar to the proposal of our 
work, but managing individual entity-based reputation. 
Considering that VIME conduct individual reputation 
evaluation based on gathered trust information which we 
actually do not simulate. We simply give a chance (99% and 
99.9% individually for curves “VIME(Accuracy=.1)” and 
“VIME(Accuracy=.01)” in Figure 5) to VIME to make the 
accurate entity-based reputation evaluation, which is fairly 
accurate compared to existing works.  
As observed in Figure 5, both methods’ effectiveness detects 
an explosion of bogus events, then the involved malicious 
vehicles got recognized with no more detected bogus event. 
This is not surprising because all malicious vehicles have 
enough credit to invest on the bogus events at the beginning of 
our simulation. After the explosion, most of spread bogus 
events are recognized with no pay back. And the malicious 
vehicles turn out to be silent. For our method, the explosion 
lasts for about 100 seconds, with barely no tail (no bogus event 
appears after 100 seconds). However, VIME (reputation 
accurate ratio =99%) has quite a long tail. Even at the end of 
our simulation, VIME’s bogues message ratio is still non-trivial. 
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Considering one may argue that the long tail is to blame the 
inaccurate bogus event recognition, we improve the reputation 
accurate ratio to 99.9%, which makes the tail turns to be thinner. 
However, the tail still exists during our simulation. Compared 
to VIME, our method suffers from the explosion, but manages 
to converge much faster. Because of the assumption that most 
vehicles manages to recognize the bogus event once upon 
receiving the event, our method suffers from a bigger bogus 
event explosion. However, since VIME conducts peer-to-peer 
reputation, the spread of malicious vehicle recognition turns to 
be much slower than our method. 
As we utilize multiple events to cross validate a bogus event,  
the more events needed for cross validation, the bigger 
explosion we would encounter at the beginning of our 
simulation. At the same time, vehicle placement density also 
impacts our simulation result, the more vehicles placed on the 
roadmap, the smaller scale of explosion our simulation suffers, 
because that more vehicles would help the recognition of bogus 
events.  
To sum up, with appropriate and careful verification of traffic 
event occurrence and termination, we believe that we are able 
to restrict the spread of bogus event in a rational range limit, 
which converges much faster than existing works. 
C. Vehicle cash 
 
Figure 6. Vehicle cash of the bogus event node over time (seconds). The y-
axis represents the amount of vehicle cash in each vehicle account. “Bad 
node ” refers to malicious vehicle in VIME and V-CASH. 
 Another important metric is the system investment on traffic 
events. How much Vcash invested on the traffic events 
indicates the confidence of the vehicles declare the event, which 
could be useful for the traffic service users. The problem is that, 
each vehicle needs to have enough Vcash to conduct investment. 
Herein, we study the Vcash changes (reputation credit of each 
vehicle) overtime in our simulation as shown in Figure 6. 
 In Figure 6, with no surprise, for both methods, normal 
vehicles keep at a much more higher level than the malicious 
nodes, which makes the normal vehicles able to spread traffic 
messages when detect one, but the attacking vehicle can hardly 
send messages because their Vcash gets to very little amount 
after a few rounds of bogus event investment. 
The Vcash of normal vehicles for our method shows a trend 
to gather a arising amount of Vcash, indicating that our method 
would fairly reward the proper traffic event declaration. 
However, reputation credit of VIME’s normal vehicle keeps at 
a stable standard, which is much lower than the initial amount.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we propose Vcash, a reputation framework for 
identifying false traffic event messages on the Internet of 
connected vehicles. By means of event trading between 
multiple vehicles in the zoning market with appropriate trading 
plans, our framework is able to avoid the bogus event spread, 
and encourage the vehicles to contribute to the process of traffic 
event detection. According to our simulation evaluation on 
highway scenario, we prove that our reputation framework 
could manage to punish the malicious vehicles which spread a 
bogus event or contribute no traffic detection. By increasing the 
quantity of traffic event verification, we can appropriately 
decrease the amount of false positive rate and false negative rate 
in our reputation framework. As future research direction for 
the improvement of our work, we would apply more roadmap 
and traffic scenarios to our framework including the multiple 
zoning markets scenario, and investigate the appropriate and 
dynamic charging rate setup to satisfy the dynamic zoning 
market trends. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported in part by the Guangdong Province 
Key Research and Development Plan (Grant No. 
2019B010137004), the National Key research and 
Development Plan (Grant No. 2018YFB0803504 and No. 
2018YFB1800701), and the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (Grant No. 61902083). 
REFERENCES 
[1]  Farzad Sabahi "The Security of Vehicular Adhoc Networks", Third 
International Conference on Computational Intelligence, Communication 
Systems and Networks (CICSyN), 2011, 338-342. 
[2]  C.-L. Huang, Y. Fallah, R. Sengupta, and H. Krishnan. Inter vehicle 
transmission rate control for cooperative active safety system. IEEE Trans. On 
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 12(3): 645 –658, Sep. 2011. 
[3]  Feng Zhang, Jianjun Hao and Shan Le "Traffic information aggregation and 
propagation scheme for vanet in city environment " 3rd IEEE International 
Conference on Broadband Network and Multimedia Technology (IC-BNMT), 
26-28 Oct. 2010, ieee 2010, 619-623. 
[4]  Halabi Hasbullah, Irshad Ahmed Soomro, Jamalul-lail Ab Manan, "Denial 
of Service (DOS) Attack and Its Possible Solutions in VANET", IEEE 2010, 
411-415. 
[5]  J. B. Kenney, G. Bansal, and C. E. Rohrs "LIMERIC a linear message rate 
control algorithm for vehicular DSRC systems", In Proceedings of the Eighth 
ACM international workshop on Vehicular inter-networking (VANET), 21–30, 
2011. 
[6]  J. Luo and J. P. Hubaux, “A survey of inter-vehicle communication,” Tech. 
Rep. IC/2004/24, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2004. 
[7]  Survey on Security Issues in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
[8]  Dharani, P., Pravin R. Patil, and C. Mahesh. "Survey on Various Security 
Issues and prevention method in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks." IOSR Journal 
of Computer Engineering 16.1 (2014): 61-66. 
[9]  Y. Xiao, V. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, and M. Galloway, “A Survey of 
Key Management Schemes in Wireless Sensor Networks,” Journal of Computer 
Communications, Vol. 30, Issue 11-12, 2314-2341, Sept. 2007.    
[10] Y. Xiao, X. Du, J. Zhang, and S. Guizani, “Internet Protocol Television 
(IPTV): the Killer Application for the Next Generation Internet,” IEEE 
Communications Magazine, Vol. 45, No. 11, 126–134, Nov. 2007. 
2327-4662 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2951620, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL 9 
[11] X. Du, Y. Xiao, M. Guizani, and H. H. Chen, “An Effective Key 
Management Scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, 
Elsevier, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 24–34, Jan. 2007.    
[12] Z. Tian, W. Shi, Y. Wang, C. Zhu, X. Du, S. Su, Y. Sun and N. Guizani. 
Real Time Lateral Movement Detection based on Evidence Reasoning Network 
for Edge Computing Environment. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics. 
2019. Vol 15(7): 4285-4294. 
[13]  X. Du and H. H. Chen, “Security in Wireless Sensor Networks,” IEEE 
Wireless Communications Magazine, Vol. 15, Issue 4, 60-66, Aug. 
2008.                
[14] X. Du, M. Guizani, Y. Xiao and H. H. Chen, Transactions papers, “A 
Routing-Driven Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Key Management Scheme 
for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless 
Communications, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1223 - 1229, March 2009. 
[15]  Ding Q, Li X, Jiang M, Zhou X. A novel reputation management 
framework for vehicular ad hoc networks. International Journal of Multimedia 
Technology. 2013 Jun;3(2):62-6. 
[16] Mershad, Khaleel W., and Hassan Artail. "A Framework for Secure and 
Efficient Data Acquisition in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks." IEEE Transactions 
on Vehicular Technology 62.2 (2013): 536-551. 
[17] Kamat, Pandurang, Arati Baliga, and Wade Trappe. "An identity-based 
security framework For VANETs." ad hoc networks (2006): 94-95. 
[18] Z. Tian, X. Gao, S. Su, J. Qiu, X. Du and M. Guizani. Evaluating 
Reputation Management Schemes of Internet of Vehicles based on 
Evolutionary Game Theory. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. 2019. 
Vol 68(6): 5971-5980. 
[19] P. Golle, D. Greene, and J. Staddon, “Detecting and correcting malicious 
data in VANETs,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM International Workshop on 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET ’04), 29–37, Philadelphia, Pa, USA, 
October 2004. 
[20] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, I. Aad, D. Jungels, and J.- P. Hubaux, 
“Eviction of misbehaving and faulty nodes in vehicular networks,” IEEE 
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 25, no. 8, 1557–1568, 2007. 
[21] N.-W. Lo and H.-C. Tsai, “Illusion attack on VANET applications—a 
message plausibility problem,” in Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Workshop on 
Automotive Networking and Applications (AutoNet ’07), 1–8, Washington, 
DC, USA, November 2007. 
[22] Lo, Naiwei, and Hsiaochien Tsai. "A reputation system for traffic safety 
event on vehicular ad hoc networks." Eurasip Journal on Wireless 
Communications and Networking 2009.1. 
[23] Ding, Qing, et al. "Reputation-based trust model in Vehicular Ad Hoc 
Networks." international conference on wireless communications and signal 
processing (2010): 1-6. 
[24] Li, Xiaoqing, et al. "RGTE: A Reputation-Based Global Trust 
Establishment in VANETs." intelligent networking and collaborative systems 
(2013): 210-214. 
[25] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, V. D. Gligor, and J.-P. Hubaux, “On data-
centric trust establishment in ephemeral ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of 
the 27th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’08), 
1238–1246, April 2008. 
[26] S. Sharma and D. R. Gupta, "Simulation Study Of Black hole Attack in 
the Mobile Ad hoc Networks," presented at the International Conference on 
Network Applications, Protocols and Services 2008. 
[27] Haddadou N, Rachedi A, Ghamri-Doudane Y. Trust and exclusion in 
vehicular ad hoc networks: an economic incentive model based approach. 
In2013 Computing, Communications and IT Applications Conference 
(ComComAp) 2013 Apr 1 (13-18). IEEE. 
[28]  L. Wu, X. Du, and J. Wu, “Effective Defense Schemes for Phishing 
Attacks on Mobile Computing Platforms,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular 
Technology, Issue 8, Vol. 65, 6678 - 6691, June 2016. 
[29] H. Zhang, S. Chen, X. Li, et al., “Interference Management for 
Heterogeneous Network with Spectral Efficiency Improvement,” IEEE 
Wireless Communications Magazine, Issue 2, Vol. 22, 101-107, April 2015. 
[30]  Y. Cheng, X. Fu, X. Du, B. Luo, M. Guizani, “A lightweight live 
memory forensic approach based on hardware virtualization,” Vol. 379, 23-41, 
Elsevier Information Sciences, Feb. 2017. 
[31] Su, S.; Sun, Y.; Gao, X.; Qiu, J.; Tian, Z. A Correlation-Change Based 
Feature Selection Method for IoT Equipment Anomaly Detection. Appl. 
Sci. 2019, 9, 437. 
[32] Z. Tian, M. Li, M. Qiu, Y. Sun, S. Su. Block-DEF: A Secure Digital 
Evidence Framework using Blockchain, Information Sciences. 491(2019) 151-
165. DOI: 10.1016/j.ins.2019.04.011. 
[33] X. Hei, X. Du, S. Lin, and I. Lee, “PIPAC: Patient Infusion Pattern based 
Access Control Scheme for Wireless Insulin Pump System,” in Proc. of IEEE 
INFOCOM 2013, Turin, Italy, Apr. 2013. 
[34] Q. Tan, Y. Gao, J. Shi, X. Wang, B. Fang and Z. Tian, Toward a 
Comprehensive Insight Into the Eclipse Attacks of Tor Hidden Services, IEEE 
Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, 1584-1593, April 2019. 
[35] Z. Tian, S. Su, W. Shi, X. Du, M. Guizani and X. Yu. A Data-driven 
Method for Future Internet Route Decision Modeling. Future Generation 
Computer Systems. 2019. Vol. 95, 212-220.  
 
Zhihong Tian, Ph.D., professor, PHD supervisor, 
Dean of cyberspace institute of advanced technology, 
Guangzhou University. Standing director of 
CyberSecurity Association of China. Member of 
China Computer Federation. From 2003 to 2016, he 
worked at Harbin Institute of Technology. His current 
research interest is computer network and network 
security. E-mail: tianzhihong@ gzhu.edu.cn.  
 
 
 
 
 Xiangsong Gao, PH. D candidate, China Academy 
of Engineer Physics. His current research interest is 
game theory and network security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shen Su, born in 1985, Ph.D., assistant professor, 
Guangzhou Unversity. His current research interests 
include inter-domain  routing and security, Internet of 
connected vehicles, and wireless sensor networks. E-
mail: johnsuhit@gmail.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jing Qiu, received the Ph.D. degree in computer 
applications technology from Beijing Institute of 
Technology. She was a Visiting Scholar with the 
University of Southern California, LA, USA, under 
the supervision of Professor Craig A. Knoblock. Her 
current research interest is Information Extraction, 
Network Representation, and Big Data Analysis. E-
mail: qiujing@ gzhu.edu.cn.  
